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The "Right of Abode" Cases: Hong
Kong's Constitutional Crisis
BY ANNE

R. FOKSTUEN*

Introduction
This note will examine the relationship between the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region ("HKSAR") and the People's
Republic of China ("PRC") after the handover, and will focus on
recent Court of Final Appeals ("CFA") decisions involving the
interpretation of Hong Kong's Constitution, the Basic Law, in the
"right of abode" context. The note will analyze the CFA's attempt to
balance autonomy and integration within the confines of the Basic
Law. Part I of this note examines the controversial Ng Ka Ling "right
of abode" decision. This decision led to the constitutional crisis of
1999, the Hong Kong government's request that the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress ("NPCSC") in Bejing
reinterpret the Basic Law in light of this decision, and the CFA's
subsequent reaffirmation of the Standing Committee's right to
interpret the Basic Law.
Part II critiques three CFA decisions involving the "right of
abode" that were handed down in 2001. These decisions consider the
"right of abode" of adopted children, the "right of abode" of Hong
Kong born children of Chinese migrants, and the impact of a prison
term on the length of residence required to obtain the "right of
abode." In these decisions, the CFA opted for a narrow definition of
the "right of abode," only granting that right to Hong Kong born
children of Chinese migrants. The CFA noted that such a small influx
of migrants would not disrupt the social and economic fabric of Hong
Kong compared to the large inflow feared after the Ng Ka Ling
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2003. I would like
to thank the inspiring lawyers of Pam Baker & Co., who first fought for the rights of the
Vietnamese refugees and then for the "right of abode" children in Hong Kong, and
especially Rob Brook for his invaluable advice and encouragement.
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decision.
Part III evaluates the most recent "right of abode" decision,
which involved 5,000 claimants. There, the CFA considered the
extent to which non-parties to a judicial proceeding can benefit from
a decision through the doctrine of legitimate expectations, and
whether there had been an abuse of process in the "right of abode"
cases. The judgment has been widely criticized on humanitarian
grounds because the CFA denied the majority of applicants the "right
of abode" despite the fact that they were in the same circumstances as
the applicants in Ng Ka Ling. Additionally, the judgment has been
criticized because the CFA's underlying reasoning inappropriately
centered on the size of the resulting influx of migrants into Hong
Kong. Critics have pointed to the judgment as a sign that Beijing's
power over the CFA remains unchanged. The note will consider the
most recent decisions in the context of the unacknowledged political
balancing act required by the judiciary in post handover Hong Kong
and will explore the outlook for the "one country, two systems"
framework set up at the time of the handover.
I. Hong Kong's Constitutional Crisis and the Basic Law
Hong Kong Special Administrative Region's (HKSAR) postcolonial Constitution, the Basic Law, grants the children of
permanent Hong Kong residents the right to legally reside in Hong
Kong.' Article 24(2) provides that a person of Chinese nationality
born outside Hong Kong to a Hong Kong permanent resident is
automatically a permanent resident.2 This "right of abode" was in
part created to ensure that children born to Hong Kong parents
outside Hong Kong would have the right to return to the city.
As early as 1992, Immigration Department officials stated that
whether children born in China to local parents could claim the "right
of abode" in Hong Kong after 1997 would depend on the
interpretation of the Basic Law.3 The source stated, "[I]t is really the
1. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Yianggang Tebie Zingzhengqu Jibenfa
[Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's
Republic
of
China],
Apr.
4,
1990,
art.
24,
available
at
http://www.constitution.or/cons/hongkong.text [hereinafter Basic Law]. The Basic
Law is Hong Kong's written constitution which has been in place since the handover
to China.
2. Id.
3. Karen Cheng & Beryl Cook, Doubt Over Right of Abode, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, Aug. 19,1992, at A3.

2003]

"Right of Abode": Hong Kong's Constitutional Crisis

way the Basic Law is interpreted that will decide if these mainland
children did have the "right of abode" in Hong Kong," adding that
the Immigration Department was well aware of the issue and was
looking at a solution.4 It was estimated that there were about 300,000
direct dependents including spouses and children of Hong Kong
residents in China. The fact that about half could be given the "right
of abode" in the territory automatically after 1997 sparked concerns
that there would be a mass influx of children that would burden Hong
Kong's infrastructure financially, socially and economically
Immediately after the handover, Hong Kong's Provisional
Legislative Counsel enacted two immigration ordinances that defined
the "right of abode" eligibility criteria and established the procedure
for mainland Chinese immigration to Hong Kong. On July 1, 1997,
the Immigration Amendment No. 2 Ordinance ("No. 2 Ordinance")
was enacted, which set forth the categories of individuals eligible for
the "right of abode," and added two new requirements to Article 24
of the Basic Law.6 The No. 2 Ordinance stated that only children
whose parents had the "right of abode" at the child's birth were
eligible for the "right of abode."7 The No. 2 Ordinance also stated
that only children born in wedlock were entitled to apply for the
"right of abode." 8
Immigration Amendment No. 3 Ordinance ("No. 3 Ordinance"),
enacted on July 10, 1997, established a "Certificate of Entitlement"
scheme under which mainland Chinese with the "right of abode"
would be allowed to emigrate to Hong Kong.9 The scheme required
mainland residents who claimed the "right of abode" through their
parents to obtain a certificate of entitlement from the HKSAR
Director of Immigration and a one-way permit (providing exit
approval or permission for immigration purposes) from the mainland
authorities." Under Immigration Amendment No. 5 Ordinance,
mainland children entitled to residency after July 1, 1997 under the
Basic Law must apply for a certificate of entitlement outside Hong
Kong before their status is confirmed. (The number of one-way
permits issued is subject to a strict quota system, such that even those
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
Hong Kong Immigration (Amendment No. 2) Ordinance (1997).
Id. sched. 1, para. 2.
Id. sched. 1, para. 1(2).
Hong Kong Immigration (Amendment No. 3) Ordinance (1997).
Id. sched. 1, para. 2(c).
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recognized by both Hong Kong and mainland authorities as having
had the "right of abode" as of January 7, 1997 are still in a "queue,"
waiting to exercise their constitutional rights, and are required to live
on the mainland in the meantime. With 60 out of 150 permits a day
reserved for children being reunited with their parents, about 300,000
people on the mainland may have to wait until 2012 to enjoy their
"right of abode.")"
The controversial bill was enacted in only one day, amidst
criticism from legal experts and human rights activists that it violated
the Basic Law.' 2 Secretary for Security Peter Lai-Hing-ling dismissed
fears that it would be challenged in court, insisting that the bill was in
no way contrary to the Basic Law and the Bill of Rights.'3
Independent Legislator Dominic Chan Choi-hi and members from
the Association for Democracy and People's Livelihood opposed the
bill and its hasty passage, stating, "Passing the bill sets a dangerous
precedent and affects the credibility of the Government."' 4
A.

Ng Ka Ling - Lifting Restrictions on the "Right of Abode'

The constitutionality of the newly enacted immigration
ordinances was challenged in Ng Ka Ling (An Infant) and Others v
Directorof Immigration5 and Chan Kam Nga (An Infant) and others
v Director of Immigration.'" Specifically, the applicants argued that
the two ordinances unconstitutionally restricted their right as
mainland born children of Hong Kong permanent residents to
emigrate under Article 24 of the Basic Law.17 In January 1999, the
CFA held in the applicants' favor, exercising its power of judicial
review under the Basic Law. First, the CFA held that courts of the
HKSAR were vested with independent judicial power. In exercising
their judicial power under the Basic Law, the courts of the region
have a duty to enforce and interpret that Law. 9 The CFA reasoned
11. Gren Mauel, A Permit for Delay and Corruption, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
May 20, 1999, at A17.
12. May Sin-Mi Hong & Angela Li, Abode Status Bill Gets Vote of Approval;
LegislatorsIgnore Growing Fears of Court Challenge to Endorse Government's Move,
S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 10, 1997, at Al.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Ng Ka Ling v Dir. of Immigration, [1997] HKLRD 1081, [1997] 3 HKC 64
16. Chan Kam Nga v Dir. of Immigration, see [1998] 1 HKLRD 142.
17. Id.
18. Ng Ka Ling, [1999] 1 HKC 291, 1999 HKC LEXIS 176.
19. Id. at *76-77.
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that the courts of the Region are to act as a constitutional check on
the executive and legislative branches of the government to ensure
that they act in accordance with the Basic Law.20 The CFA noted that
"what has been controversial is the jurisdiction of the courts of the
region to examine whether any legislative acts of the NPCSC are
consistent with the Basic Law and to declare them invalid if found to
be inconsistent."2" The CFA held that the jurisdiction to interpret and
enforce the Basic Law necessarily entailed jurisdiction over the
National People's Congress and its Standing Committee to ensure
their compliance with the Basic Law.22
The CFA stated that any limitation on the CFA's jurisdiction
must be found in the Basic Law itself.23 In doing so, it referred to
Article 19(3), which states, "The courts of the Special Administrative
Region shall have no jurisdiction over acts of state, such as defense
and foreign affairs. ... ,24 The CFA noted that Article 158 contained
a restriction on its jurisdiction to interpret issues "concerning affairs
which are the responsibility of the Central People's Government or
concerning the relationship between the Central Authorities and the
Region," and that the Basic Law obligates the 25CFA to seek an
interpretation of those provisions from the NPCSC.
The CFA stated that it was for the CFA and "for it alone" to
decide whether a reference to the NPCSC should be made.26
Subsequently, the CFA held that the predominant provision before it
was Article 24, a non-excluded provision that provides for the "right
of abode" of a permanent resident and the contents of that right.27
Although Article 22(4), which imposes a restriction on the "right of
abode" if the person was still in mainland China, was arguably
relevant to the interpretation of Article 24, the CFA concluded that it
did not have to refer the matter to the National People's Congress.?
The CFA held that although the provisions of Article 22(4) applied to
the overwhelming population on the mainland, it did not apply to

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

*77.
*79.
*82.

*97.
*102-104.
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permanent residents of the region.29 The CFA then concluded that

mainland laws requiring exit approval for mainland residents coming
to Hong Kong, although fully enforceable on the mainland, could not
provide a basis for limiting rights conferred by the Basic Law. It
further concluded that the No. 3 Ordinance was unconstitutional to
the extent that it required permanent residents of the HKSAR to
hold a one-way permit
before they could enjoy their constitutional
"right of abode., 30
The CFA next addressed the illegitimacy issue.3 The CFA held
that the ordinance's discrimination between legitimate and
illegitimate children ran contrary to the principles of equality
enshrined in the Basic Law.32 Hong Kong domestic legislation usually
treats illegitimate children on an equal footing with legitimate
children.33 Considering the language of the third category of Article
24(2), and the CFA held that the plain meaning of the provision was
that it covered persons born in and out of wedlock.34 It reasoned that
a child born out of wedlock was no less a person born of such a
resident than a child born in wedlock, and thereby invalidated the
ordinance as unconstitutional.35 Illegitimate children borne of a
parent with Hong Kong permanent residency were as entitled to the
"right of abode" as legitimate children; the provision was
unconstitutional in that it excluded children born out of wedlock.36

In a separate opinion issued on the same day, the CFA declared
unconstitutional the only remaining "right of abode" restriction
imposed by the No. 2 Ordinance. This restriction stated that only
children born after their parents had acquired permanent residence
could claim the "right of abode" under Article 24(3) of the Basic
Law.37 Using analysis similar to its legitimacy analysis in Ng Ka Ling,
the CFA held that the "natural meaning" of Article 24(3) included all
children born of permanent residents regardless of when the parents
acquired such status. 38 The CFA also noted that an unrestricted
29. Id.
30. Id. at *105.
31. Id. at *115.
32. Id. at *116.
33. Id. at *116-117.
34. Id. at *117.
35. Id. at *118.
36. Id.
37. Chan Kam Nga v Dir. of Immigration, 1999- 1 HKC LEXIS 347, available at
1999 HKC LEXIS *177.
38. Id. at*17.
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"right of abode" serves the purpose of enabling a child to be with its
parent in Hong Kong, thereby securing the unity of the family.39
After Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Ng, all major restrictions on the
"right of abode" after the handover were lifted.
B. The Political Crisis: Clarification and Interpretation
The CFA's judgment in Ng Ka Ling was widely acclaimed in
Hong Kong as strengthening the rule of law, but the Hong Kong and
mainland governments were displeased by the tone and content of the
judgment." Hong Kong's Secretary for Justice, Elsie Leung, traveled
to Beijing to discuss the "right of abode" decision, and on February
24, 1999, filed an application for clarification on the judgment with
the CFA.4 The CFA responded with an opinion that clarified its
decision, and acknowledged that its judicial power was derived from
the Basic Law, which vests the power to interpret the Basic Law in
the NPCSC under Articles 158(2) and 158(3).42 The CFA noted that
the courts of Hong Kong would follow an interpretation by the
NPCSC if it were consistent with the Basic Law,43 and stated that it

could not question the authority of the NPC or the Standing
Committee to do any act in accordance with the provisions of the
Basic Law."
In Hong Kong, the clarification "was seen as an act to placate
mainland authorities rather than an as exercise in elucidation."45 To
many observers, the clarification was a sign that the CFA was unable
to withstand political pressure, and that it was prepared to take a
political course on flimsy legal grounds.46 It is ironic and regrettable

that it was the Hong Kong government, not the mainland government
that was the first to curtail judicial independence.47
Criticism of the decision centered on the CFA's failure to
39. Id. at *18.
40. HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE, CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION
(Johannes M. M. Chan, H. L. Fu, Yash P. Gai eds., Hong Kong Univ. Press 2000)
[hereinafter HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE].
41. Tenth Annual Philip D. Reed Memorial Issue Special Report: One Country,
Two Systems, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 12 (1999).
42. See Ng Ka Ling (an infant) v. Dir. of Immigration, 1999- 1 HKC 425; available
at 1999 HKC LEXIS -178, *7.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE, supra note 40, at 18.
46. Id. at 181.
47. Id.
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account for the consequences of the decision. The more liberal the
interpretation of section 24(2)(3), the greater the number of people
who would be entitled to emigrate to Hong Kong.48 Hong Kong's
government embarked on a strategy of mobilizing opposition to the
CFA's decision.
Armed with questionable estimates that an
additional 1.67 million mainlanders would become eligible for the
"right of abode" over the next seven years, the government
announced that it intended to overturn the CFA in view of the
intolerable burden on Hong Kong's infrastructure and social
services.49 The government argued that only a reversal or nullification

of the CFA decision could avoid a crisis, and Chief Executive Tung
Chee-wah subsequently asked the PRC to interpret the relevant
provisions of the Basic Law according to what the government
deemed to be the true legislative intent:" The NPCSC then
interpreted the Basic Law to require at least one parent to have been
a permanent resident at the time of the child's birth for the child to be
eligible for the "right of abode." 5' The Committee also reinstated the
requirement that mainland Chinese claimants abide by the challenged
Immigration Ordinance."
The government's announcement that it was seeking an NPC
interpretation on the "right of abode" sparked concerns about the
legitimacy of the CFA.53 It also helped clarify the Hong Kong-Beijing
relationship and the limits on judicial autonomy. 4 After the "right of
abode" controversy, it was clear that China would get involved when
it felt its authority was being threatened, but that it would maintain a
more hands-off approach in other areas.5 Mainland authorities were
likely concerned about the principles established and the
independence shown by the CFA in its judgment. The end result was
to separate countless Hong Kong parents from their children on the
mainland.56
48. Id. at 32.
49. Id. at 201.
50. Frank Ching, Scare Tactics, FAR. E. ECON. REV., May 13, 1999, available at
1999 WL-FEER 8674977.
51. Michael Laris, China Throws Out Ruling of Hong Kong Court, WASH. POST
FOREIGN SERV., June 27, 1999, at A23.
52. Id.
53. Frank Ching, Hong Kong: Reality Check, FAR E. Eco. REV., June 3, 1999,
availableat 1999 WL-FEER 8675098.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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C. The CFA Acknowledges Defeat
In December 1999, the CFA duly acknowledged defeat in Lau
Kong Yung v. Director of Immigration, where it comprehensively

repudiated the principles of its January 1999 decision.57 In Lau Kong
Yung, the CFA considered the validity and effect of the NPCSC's
interpretation of the "right of abode" in a case involving mainland
Chinese migrants who claimed the "right of abode" on the basis that
at least one of their parents was a permanent Hong Kong resident. 8
The CFA formally overturned Ng Ka Ling, holding that the
provisions declared unconstitutional in that judgment were in fact
constitutional. 9 Further, the CFA rejected the argument that the
NPCSC had no power to interpret the Basic Law except in cases
where judicial reference was made, and noted that such
interpretations were binding on the courts of Hong Kong.' It held
that the exercise of that power was not dependent on the referral of a
question from the judiciary and that the interpretation dated back to
July 1, 1997, the day the Basic Law came into effect.6" The CFA left
open the issue of whether that interpretation was to be applied
retroactively.
According to the CFA, it was clear that the NPCSC has the
power to interpret the Basic Law under both Article 67(4) of the PRC
Constitution and Article 158(1) of the Basic Law, and that the power
of interpretation vested in the National People's Congress under
Article 158(1) was given in "general and unqualified" terms.62 The
CFA also noted that the courts of Hong Kong were authorized to
interpret provisions within the limits of the courts' autonomy on their
own.63 The CFA said very little about the classification and necessity
conditions and the predominant test for judicial reference as
delineated in Ng Ka Ling. However, the CFA noted that "the Court
may need to revisit the classification and necessity conditions and the

predominant test in an appropriate case." 6
The CFA noted that the Standing Committee's interpretation
57. HONG KONG'S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE, supra note 40, at xiv.

58. Lau Kong Yung v. Dir. of Immigration, [1999] 3 HKLRD 778; 1999 WL
33178146.
59. Id. at *787.
60. Id. at *797.

61. Id. at *798, 802.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at *797.
64. Id. at *800 (emphasis added).
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was binding on the courts of Hong Kong, but that previously
rendered judgments should not be affected by the NPCSC's
interpretation. 6' The opinion did not deal with persons who would
not be affected by the interpretation, and did not consider the issue of
the Chief Executive's right to ask the NPCSC for an interpretation.66
The CFA's failure to determine which individuals would fall outside
the scope of the interpretation (thus being governed by the CFA's
decision in Ng Ka Ling) meant that this issue would be litigated in the
future, as it could be argued that all parties who were in the same
position as the original litigants should benefit from the CFA's
decision in Ng Ka Ling.67

Critics have blamed the Hong Kong government for seeking an
interpretation of the Basic Law rather than the central government
for providing it, but some have argued that the fault was with the
CFA itself.6 U.S. legal scholar Jerome Cohen believes that the CFA
precipitated the problem by "unnecessarily and erroneously"
asserting that it had the power to invalidate legislation enacted by the
NPC and by not referring a question to the NPCSC as required by the
Basic Law. 69 Others argue that the CFA should never have taken
jurisdiction of what was essentially a political question." However, in
Ng Ka Ling, the CFA clearly stated the limits to its jurisdiction and
the conditions under which it had to make a reference to the Standing
Committee.7
The Ng Ka Ling court criticized the argument that mainland law
provides a constitutional basis for restricting a constitutional right
under the Basic Law, stating that it was untenable and would have far
reaching implications. Indeed, if mainland law can restrict a
constitutional right in Hong Kong, then it can be argued that there
are no separate Hong Kong constitutional rights, and that the Hong
Kong judiciary is no longer independent of the mainland. The CFA
65. Id. at *799.
66. Yash Ghai, The NPC Interpretation and Its Consequences, in HONG KONG'S
NATIONAL DEBATE, supra note 40, at 211.
67. Id.
68. Frank Ching, The Basic Law 10 Years On, FAR. E. ECON. REV., Apr. 20,
2000, available at 2000 WL-FEER 8518415.
69. Id.
70. Albert H.Y. Chen, The Court of FinalAppeal's Ruling in the 'Illegal Migrant'
Children Case: Congressional Supremacy and Judicial Review, in HONG KONG'S
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE, supra note 40, at 87.
71. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC LEXIS, at *87.
72. Ng Ka Ling, 1 HKC LEXIS, at *104.
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also notes that restricting the application of Mainland law was
essential to the implementation of the "one country, two systems"
principle. 3
II. The CFA Returns to the "Right of Abode" in 2001
The CFA returned to the "right of abode" issue in July 2001
when it issued three separate decisions reaffirming the basic tenets of
Lau Kong Yung.74 The CFA's decisions helped to clarify some of the
uncertainty that followed the constitutional crisis of 1999, and was a
step in the development of the "one country, two systems" concept.75
In a show of independence, the CFA rejected the government's
assertions that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the case and that it had to
ask the NPCSC in Beijing for an interpretation of the Basic Law
before issuing a decision.76
The CFA held that the Basic Law provides for a separate legal
system in Hong Kong based on the common law. Under this system,
Hong Kong courts adjudicate cases based on the common law and
may refer to precedents of other common law jurisdictions.77 The
CFA further held that the Basic Law itself provides for a separate
legal system in Hong Kong based on the common law." Under the

common law, the role of the courts is to construe the language used in
the text of the instrument to ascertain legislative intent.79 It added
that the text of the enactment is the law, and that it is important both
that the law be certain and that it be ascertainable by the citizen. 0
The CFA affirmed that national laws should not be applied in
Hong Kong except for in matters relating to defense, foreign policy,
and matters outside the autonomy of the region." It noted that one of
the fundamental functions of the courts' exercise of independent
judicial power is the interpretation of the law, which includes the
Basic Law itself. This authority is subject to the limits on the courts'
73. Id. at *105.
74. Dir. of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, [2001] 2 HKLRD 533; Tam Nga
Yin v. Dir. of Immigration, [2001] 2 HKLRD 644; Fateh Muhammad v. Comm'r of
Registration, [2001] 2 HKLRD 659.
75. Cliff Buddle, A Parting of Legal Clouds, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 21,
2001, at A13.
76. Rewriting the Basic Law, ASIAN WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2001, at A6.
77. Chong Fung-Yuen, [2001] 2 HKLRD 544.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 546.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 544.
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jurisdiction imposed by Article 158 and any interpretation by the
NPCSC under Article 158.'
The CFA stated that a generous
interpretation should be given to provisions that contain
constitutional guarantees of freedom that lie at the heart of Hong
Kong's separate system."'
The CFA rejected the government's argument that it was under a
duty to seek an interpretation of Article 24(2)(1) from the NPCSC
under Article 158. 4 The government had proposed that any provision
of the Basic Law whose implementation would have a substantive
effect on the mainland and the relationship between the mainland
authorities and Hong Kong had to be referred to the NPC.8' The
CFA noted that under such a test, most if not all of the Basic Law
could fall in the category of laws that must go to the Standing
Committee for interpretation. 6
A. "Right of Abode," But Only Forthe Chosen Few
In Director of Immigration v. Chong Fung Yuen, the CFA
considered the language of Article 24(2)(1) in light of its context and
purpose, and held that it gave permanent resident status to Chinese
citizens born in Hong Kong both before and after July 1, 1997.87 The
CFA noted that there was no indication its decision would result in an
immediate influx of people from the mainland, and pointed to the
government's own estimate that only 1,991 persons were born to
Chinese parents who were illegal immigrants, overstayers, or
visitors.8 This stood in stark contrast to the mass inflow predicted by
the government after the Ng Ka Ling decision. 9
China supporters reacted critically to the Chong Fung-Yuen
judgment." The local deputy for the NPC, Ma Lik, said the CFA had
wrongly interpreted the relevant provisions of the Basic Law. 91
However, others were more supportive. Eric Cheung Tat-ming,
82. Id. at 545.
83. Id. at 546.

84. Id. at 540.
85. Id. at 548.
86. Id. at 551.
87. Id. at 555.
88. ld. at 549.
89. Id.
90. Ambrose Leung & Chow Chung Yan, Decision "Disrespectful" to China's
Law, S. CHINA MORNING POST, July 21, 2001, at A2.
91. Id.
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assistant professor in the Law Department of the University of Hong
Kong, said the ruling reaffirmed the principle of law and the
constitution.' Professor Albert Chen-Hung-yee, a member of the
Basic Law Committee, hailed the ruling as a triumph of Hong Kong's
legal independence.93 He noted that the number of clauses that
needed to be reinterpreted by the NPC because of cross-border
implications had been narrowed considerably.94
In Tam Nga Yin v. Directorof Immigration, the CFA considered
the proper interpretation of Article 24(2)(3) and whether Chinese
citizens, born on the mainland and adopted by permanent Hong
Kong residents, were permanent residents with the "right of abode."95
The CFA noted that Article 24(2)(3) confers the "right of abode" on
persons of Chinese nationality born outside Hong Kong of those
residents listed in categories (1) and (2)." The CFA then stated that
if the language of the provision had been ambiguous, the principles of
judicial interpretation would require the CFA to lean in favor of an
interpretation that included adopted children.97 But the CFA
concluded that the phrase "born... of" was unambiguous, referring
only natural children. To hold otherwise would involve reading
"born" only as relating to place of birth, and treating the word "of" as
virtually meaningless.98 Therefore, the appellants, minor children
born on the mainland and adopted in accordance with mainland law,
did not have the "right of abode" even though at least one of the
parents had become a permanent resident at the time of their birth."
The dissent, however, noted that the relationship between an
adoptive parent and adopted child was certainly a parent-child
relationship, and that a reading of the statute that promoted family
unity was preferable and valued at both social and constitutional
Commentators argued that the decision could best be
levels."
explained by fears that a positive ruling would have resulted in a
dramatic growth in questionable adoptions on the mainland and

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Tam Nga Yin, [2001] 2 HKLRD 644, 650-651.
Id.
Id. at 656.
Id.
Id. at 656-657.
Id. at 658.
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related "right of abode" claimants. 101
The CFA's third decision, Fateh Muhammad v. Commissioner of
Registration, differed from the other two decisions as it involved a
"right of abode" claim by a non-Chinese national. 2 The applicant, a
Pakistani national who had resided in Hong Kong since the 1960s
argued that he had the "right of abode" under Article 24(4), which
provided that persons not of Chinese nationality who resided in Hong
Kong for not less than seven years and had taken Hong Kong as their
permanent residence, were entitled to the "right of abode.""' 3 Noting
that Mr. Muhammad had been in prison for three years, the CFA
held that the term "ordinarily resident" could not be stretched to
include time spent in prison." However, the CFA left open the
possibility that a stay of one day in prison would not defeat a claim
for the "right of abode."'' 5
The CFA also held that the seven continuous years must come
immediately before the time when an application for permanent
residence is made."116 Under this holding, the appellant could re-apply
once he had met the seven-year time requirement, and there was no
reason to believe the Director of Immigration would be unwilling to
lift any limits on his stay."'7 The CFA left open another significant
issue: whether permanent resident status should be dependent, as it is
now, on the Director of Immigration's sole discretion in choosing to
lift the restrictions on a person's stay before an application could be
made.''" The CFA questioned whether it was constitutional to make
such an applicant's permanent resident's status dependent on an
exercise of administrative discretion, or failing that, a successful
administrative appeal, or failing even that, a successful judicial review
challenge.""' It noted that "this is a serious question to be determined
on some future occasion on which it may arise.""'
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B. A Politically Cautious Court, Unwilling to Confront the
Government.
These opinions confirmed the CFA's focus on the political
realities of Hong Kong and its desire to avoid further intervention by
the Hong Kong government and Beijing. In the opinions, the CFA
spoke of reasserting its independence but continued to show a lack of
resolve against political pressure. The CFA stated that a generous
interpretation should be given to provisions that deal with
constitutional guarantees of freedom, and undoubtedly there is a
political need in terms of the CFA's perceived legitimacy to use
language suggesting that judicial independence still exists.
The real question is whether the CFA is actually prepared to
make decisions exercising its powers in a manner compatible with the
common law against the government in cases that matter to the
government. When considering whether it was constitutional to make
such an applicant's Hong Kong permanent resident status dependent
on a successful exercise of administrative discretion, the CFA chose
to leave the door open. Although it was not necessary to decide this
issue (and it was therefore not improper for it to decline to do so in a
formal sense), the CFA should have done more than make a few
disguised, disparaging remarks about the government.
Similarly, the CFA's holding in favor of Chong Fong Yuen was
not a show of judicial independence but the opposite. The language
was so clear that there could be no other decision as a matter of law.
The government's decision to argue the case is indicative of the
degree to which it believes it can and should exercise control over the
judiciary. The CFA's decision appears to be have been subject to its
determination that the political consequences were insubstantial
enough to allow it to grant the applicants the "right of abode"
because such a small number of claimants were involved. Although
the number of claimants involved is irrelevant as a legal consideration
under the common law, the CFA not only took it into account, but
felt it so important that it formed part of the justification for its
decision.
The CFA's decision on who was entitled to the "right of abode"
was more political than legal; it granted the "right of abode" to
children in the position of Chong Fung Yuen, yet rejected the claims
of adopted children, who are otherwise treated as equivalent to
natural born children under Hong Kong law. This decision, heart
breaking from a humanitarian point of view, can only be understood
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against a backdrop of a potential for abuse by the corrupt system on
the mainland, uncertainty surrounding the number of potential
applicants that could attempt to take advantage of the CFA's ruling,
and a risk of renewed government intervention. Yet the CFA
justified its decision in Lau Kong Yong by finding that the mainland's
one-way permit system, which has similar problems with corruption,
holds weight in Hong Kong. Moreover, the CFA did not have to find
that abusive and untrue adoptions achieved through corruption must
be recognized, and could have structured its decision to accept only
genuinely established adoptions.
III. The CFA and the Validity of Previously Rendered
Judgments
The CFA returned to the "right of abode" issue on January 10,
2002, in a closely watched decision involving 5,114 claimants that was
expected to reverberate far beyond the walls of the courtroom."' In
Ng Siu Tong v. Directorof Immigration, the CFA had to resolve an
issue that had been left unanswered in Lau Kong Yung: which, if any,
of the various categories of claimants were entitled to the "right of
abode" based on the CFA's January 1999 interpretation in Ng Ka
Ling. Under Ng Ka Ling, these determinations were based on when
the applicants arrived in Hong Kong, when they were born and when
their parents became permanent residents."' Prior to the decision,
there were concerns that the government would respond to a
judgment in favor of the applicants by seeking another reinterpretation from Beijing, a move that would be viewed as eroding
the rule of law.' 3
The applicants argued that although they were not parties to the
Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga litigation, they were entitled to
benefit from the January 1999 CFA decision, and were thereby
entitled to the "right of abode.""' 4 The applicants were divided into
two groups: Group A consisted of applicants born after a parent had
become a permanent resident; Group B was comprised primarily of
applicants who were born before either parent had become entitled to
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permanent residence. "5 Because of the large number of parties, a
total 11of6 twenty-seven persons were chosen as representative test
cases.

The applicants based their case on five separate grounds for
appeal."7 Under the previously rendered judgment doctrine, the
applicants argued that they had accrued the "right of abode" under
the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga judgments and should not be

affected by the NPCSC's interpretation."8 Separately, the applicants
argued that if they were considered to have been affected by the
interpretation, they had a legitimate expectation of receiving the
same treatment as the parties in the two cases as a result of the public
statements made by the government to the applicants." 9
Alternatively, they argued that it would be an abuse of process, in
view of the grave injustice suffered by the applicants, for the Director
The
of Immigration to execute removal orders against them.2
applicants who arrived in Hong Kong prior to July 1, 1997, when the
Basic Law took effect, and those who arrived between July 1 and July
10, 1997, when the No. 3 Ordinance was enacted, argued that they
were not affected by either the interpretation or the No. 3 Ordinance,
which did not apply retroactively. 2 ' The applicants who had arrived
before the CFA judgment in January, 1999 argued that they had a
legitimate expectation that they would be treated as parties to the
Nga Ka King and Chan Kam Nga judgments provided they could

satisfy the conditions contained in the concession.'22
A. A Limited "Right of Abode" Based On Specific
Representations.
The CFA first examined the argument that "judgments
previously rendered shall not be affected," (the previously rendered
judgment doctrine) and held that it would make little sense to protect
judgments previously rendered in the case of an interpretation made
on a reference under Article 158(3), but not in the case of a free
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standing interpretation.' 23 To read the protection as applying in both
cases conformed with the vesting of judicial power in the courts of the
region and the vesting of the power of final adjudication in the
CFA.124 The CFA further held that its power of final adjudication
would be compromised if a CFA judgment were not to stand
unaffected by an interpretation issued under Article 158(1).125 The
CFA reasoned that even if such an interpretation displaced a previous
judgment, that previous judgment was still the final determination of
the rights of the parties in the previous litigation. 126
The CFA then rejected the applicants' argument that sought to
equate "judgments" with "rights declared" so as to treat the judgment
as declaring rights in favor of an entire class of persons. It noted that
the "right of abode" declared in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga was
limited to the plaintiffs in those proceedings, and was not a
declaration of rights in favor of anyone else. 27 Although Ng Ka Ling
and Chan Kam Nga were seen as "representative cases," unlike the
case at bar, neither case involved a court order that made the
plaintiffs representative parties.2 2 The CFA noted that a judgment
does not bind strangers to the litigation. While judgment may
operate by virtue of the doctrine of precedent to compel a similar
outcome in other like cases, it has no binding force between either a
stranger to the litigation or a party to the litigation and someone who
is not a party to the litigation.' 21 In doing so, the CFA disregarded the
plaintiff's argument that the case involved public law litigation.
Under common law, a test case will determine any principles of
law in accordance with the doctrine of precedent.' A test case in the
field of public law will, however, have an effect that goes beyond
this.'3
Often the question at issue will be the application of
uncontentious principles of public law to a particular factual
situation.'32
In such circumstances, parties who defer their
proceedings to await the result of the test case will have a legitimate
123. Id. T 28
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. '[
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expectation to be given similar relief or treatment to the applicant in
the test case. 33

Because the legislation at issue in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Ng
was in effect until the time of the judgments, these applicants had
been subjected to the unconstitutional legislation. They did not need
to be named litigants for the CFA's judgments to have a direct legal
effect on their cases. This illustrates the difference between private
law litigation, which creates precedents to be followed in other cases,
and public law litigation, which by its nature affects entire classes of
persons. The CFA ignored these arguments because it could not
otherwise find against the applicants while appearing to be judicially
independent.
The applicants argued that they had "legitimate expectations" of
being treated like the parties in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga,
which had been seen as test cases by virtue of statements made by
public officials and representations made to individual applicants by
the Director of Immigration and the Legal Aid Department. The
applicants argued that the cumulative effect of these matters had
given rise to legitimate expectations.'34 Under the doctrine of
substantive legitimate expectations, persons may have a legitimate
expectation of a substantive outcome or benefit. Under these
circumstances, a court's failure to honor the expectation may result in
such unfairness to individuals as to amount to an abuse of power,
justifying judicial intervention."'
The CFA acknowledged that Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga,

which involved contentious issues of public law, were generally
understood to be "test cases."' 36 The CFA noted that there were
three categories of representations: (1) the public (general)
representations that the government would abide by the decisions of
the CFA; (2) the private (specific) representations in the Legal Aid
pro forma responses; and (3) representations that the Secretary for
Security had made to one applicant (RA13).' The CFA stated that
all three categories of representation created the same legitimate
expectation, and that the language of the public representations was
no less inclined to induce reliance than the private representations.' 38
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
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Because the public representations affected a large group, the CFA
found the legitimate expectations created thereby were not
enforceable.139 The CFA gave no authority in support of this finding.
The CFA noted that the legislative purpose behind the
Director's statutory power of discretion to allow immigrants without
the "right of abode" to remain in Hong Kong would be undermined if
all those in similar circumstances to the applicants, potentially as
many as 600,000, were allowed to enter and live in Hong Kong.' The
overwhelming force of the immigration policy could override
legitimate expectations based on general representations.'4 ' However,
the Director of Immigration could lawfully exercise his discretionary
powers in favor of applicants with legitimate expectations based on
specific representations made to them as individuals because they
constituted a discrete and ascertainable class.'42 The CFA held that
the disappointment of this class had given rise to a very substantial
degree of unfairness, which the Director could partly alleviate by a
favorable exercise of his power. 43' However, the CFA dismissed the
abuse of process issue, holding that the judgments in Ng Ka Ling and
Chan Kam Nga were not the product of an abuse of process and the
Director of Immigration's acts did not implicate an abuse of process
because they were not part of a court proceeding.'44
The CFA then considered the specific applicants in the case, and
held that those who had been born after one parent had become a
permanent resident and who had arrived in Hong Kong before July 1,
1997 were entitled to the "right of abode.""'4 The CFA held that the
position of these applicants was unaffected by any Hong Kong
legislation since the Basic Law did not come into effect until July 1,
46
1997 and the No. 3 Ordinance did not have retroactive effect.
Applicants who were born before either parent had become a
permanent resident and arrived in Hong Kong before July 1, 1997
were impacted by the time of birth requirement of Article 24(2)(3), as
interpreted by the NPCSC, and were not entitled to benefit from the
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Chan Kam Nga judgment.' 7 Applicants who had arrived in Hong
Kong between July 1, 1997 and July 10, 1997 were governed by
Article 22(4) of the Basic Law and needed to obtain approval from
the Mainland before entering Hong Kong and exercising their "right
of abode."'48
The CFA next considered whether applicants who had arrived
before January 29, 1999, when the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga
decisions were announced, had a legitimate expectation that they
would be treated as if they were parties to that litigation provided
they could satisfy the conditions contained in the Chief Executive's
concession.' 9 To benefit from the policy decision announced by the
Chief Executive, the CFA held that the applicant had to have been in
Hong Kong within the period between July 1, 1997 and January 29,
1999, and the applicant must have lodged a claim for "right of abode"
with the Immigration Department.5 The CFA noted that as long as
the message in the letter to the Immigration Department was clear
and could reasonably be understood to constitute a request to be
granted the right of abode in Hong Kong, it was enough to constitute
a claim in substance. 5'
B. The Dissent The "Right of Abode" Cannot be Taken Away
The CFA decision was not unanimous, however, as Justice
Bokhary dissented.'52 He noted that at the time the judgments in Ng
Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga's case were delivered, all the applicants
were Chinese nationals born on the Mainland who had at least one
parent who was a Hong Kong permanent resident within categories
(1) and (2) of Article 24(2).'
Therefore, they all had Hong Kong
permanent resident status under the Basic Law as interpreted by the
CFA's judgment in those two cases.'54 Through the previously
rendered judgments, the applicants had all acquired Hong Kong
permanent resident status under the two judgments, a status that is
unaffected by the Standing Committee's interpretation.'
Judge
147.
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Bokhary noted that the Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga cases
involved constitutional litigation regarding an entrenched right, and
that the nature of such litigation is that all the persons whose existing
circumstances put them in the relevant
position acquire crystallized
6
rights under a favorable judgment.1
Judge Bokhary further noted that the standard of review in such
cases should always be strict given the very important role played by
the doctrine of legitimate expectations in the preservation of the rule
of law.' In Judge Bokhary's view, the standard of review should be
particularly strict in a case like the present where the legitimate
expectation concerned an entrenched constitutional right like the
"right of abode."'58 He noted that each of the four categories of
representations made to the applicants gave rise to their legitimate
expectations of being treated in the same manner as abode seekers in
Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga based on the relevant legal principles
and material circumstances of the case.' 9 All the representations,
even those in the form of communication to an individual, were in
substance of the kind directed to a class, and the applicants were all
members of that class that would benefit from the Ng Ka Ling and
Chan Kam Nga judgments.1" Therefore, the Director of Immigration
must exercise his discretion and take into account the appellants'
legitimate expectations of being treated as similarly as possible to the
abode seekers in Ng Ka Ling and Chan Kam Nga's case. 16' He noted
that if "there is a wide ranging abuse of executive power to be
protected against, then there is no reason why a discretion available
to protect against such62 abuse of power cannot be exercised
commensurately widely.'
Conclusion: No Clear Winners and Mostly Losers In the "Right
of Abode" Saga
At the end of the "right of abode" saga, it is clear that there are
two losers: (1) the mainland born children of Hong Kong residents
who were entitled to the "right of abode," but who found no court
willing to enforce their right; and (2) the independence of the Hong
156.
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Kong judiciary, which has yet to recover.
The Immigration
Department stated that while it will review the "right of abode"
seekers' cases, only those with "very exceptional cases" based on
"strong humanitarian grounds" will be allowed to stay beyond the
March 31, 2002 grace period."3 The number of cases falling into these
parameters is expected to be very small. Of the 8,100 mainland
migrants estimated to be in Hong Kong, only one-third had arrived
after the 1999 CFA ruling, which makes their chances of being able to
stay very slim."' The "right of abode" claimants will appeal to the
United Nations to pressure the Hong Kong government into allowing
them to stay."' However, Hong Kong's Human Rights Committee
Chairman is not optimistic that the United Nations will be able to
redress the claimants' grievances since the government was not
obligated to act."6 Legislator and lawyer Audrey Eu-Yuet-mee said:
"I doubt very much whether the Government would give a lot of
emphasis to international opinion."'67

The CFA's ruling shows the binding effect of Beijing's
reinterpretation. Although the CFA conceded that the claimants'
grievances were legitimate, it was unwilling to give them redress."'
The head of the Hong Kong Bar Association, Alan Leong Kah-kit
noted that the sword of Damocles is still hanging over the CFA
following the "right of abode" ruling, an allusion made by his
predecessor to the power of Beijing's reinterpretation of the Basic
Law in June 1999.169

Hong Kong's "right of abode" saga raises questions about the
vulnerability and the independence of the judiciary and whether a
system of regional autonomy can exist without a strong legal regime
or democratic politics."' The constitutional jurisprudence of the
HKSAR necessarily implies some interplay between the Chinese and
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the Hong Kong system. Of concern is the prospect that there will be
a fundamental shift in the concept and practice of legality in Hong
Kong, away from the common law tradition and towards a more
administrative legality where the dictates of the government carry
more authority than the law and
where the courts are effectively
7
subordinated to the government. '
It would be unrealistic to expect that the Hong Kong common
law system would remain self-contained and untouched after the
handover. What has been unexpected is that the attacks on the courts
and the legal system have mostly come from within, as the Hong
Kong government shows growing disregard for the law and the value
of an independent judiciary.
After an initial showing of
independence in Ng Ka Ling, the CFA is increasingly offering judicial
opinions that do not threaten the government's position. The CFA
granted the "right of abode" to the children in Chong Fung-Yuen
because it would not result in the mass inflow feared in Ng Ka Ling.
It then used similar reasoning in Ng Siu Tong's artificial distinction
between legitimate expectations based on public and private
representations. However, the numbers of parties involved should be
irrelevant as a legal consideration.
The CFA is moving away from traditional common law
principles and jurisprudence.
The survival of an independent
judiciary in post handover Hong Kong can no longer be taken for
granted. Indeed, after the "right of abode" saga, it can be argued that
judicial independence no longer exists as a serious check on the
executive branch in Hong Kong. The promise of "one country, two
systems" only exists in matters where Hong Kong does not threaten
the authority of the mainland.
The "right of abode" saga
acknowledges that the final powers of interpretation over the Basic
Law and Hong Kong's legal system lies not with the CFA but with a
political body in Beijing.

171. Id. at 7.

